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INTRODUCTION
I am both honored and saddened to have this opportunity to
remember Laura Chisolm and her pioneering work on advocacy by
tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations. What set Laura’s work apart was
her identification of the fundamental policy concerns driving the
federal tax law’s restrictions on advocacy and her exposure of how
†
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those restrictions were not always consistent with such concerns. 1
With this Article, I plan to take a similar approach to the much more
modest topic of disclosure obligations for tax-exempt nonprofits
engaged in political activity.
The political involvement of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations,
which often do not disclose their financial supporters, has become a
topic of national interest. 2 While such involvement is nothing new,
the Supreme Court’s recent Citizens United decision and the resulting
focus on the flows of corporate, union, and wealthy individuals’ funds
into election-related activities has brought this involvement to the fore
of the public’s consciousness. 3 This increased attention has led to
growing calls to publicly expose the financial dealings of politically
involved nonprofit organizations, including the identities of their
donors. 4
1 See, e.g., Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 207 (1987) (“The underlying principles can and should be
identified; the law can and should be designed to reflect them.”); Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics
and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 315 (1990)
(“[A]s currently formulated and applied, the section 501(c)(3) absolute prohibition on campaign
intervention is constitutionally questionable, incongruent with campaign finance regulation,
inconsistent with the premises underlying the charitable tax exemption, and contrary to free
speech values.”).
2 See, e.g., Dave Helling, Campaign Maneuver Lets Donors Stay Secret, KANSAS C ITY
STAR, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1 (observing that “[a] maneuver not uncommon in other parts of the
nation—using a nonprofit group to influence elections while keeping its donors secret—has
landed in Missouri's judicial battle with a good-sized splash”); Mike McIntire, Under TaxExempt Cloak, Political Dollars Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A1 (covering political
nonprofit’s funding of attack ads without disclosure of financing or close ties to a Republican
consulting operation); Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs And Secret Money: The Unregulated
Shadow Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2011, 10:40 AM, updated Sept. 27, 2011,
12:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26/super-pacs-secret-money-campaignfinance_n_977699.html (recounting rise of independent campaign organizations receiving
unlimited and undisclosed contributions as part of a “sea change” in the federal campaign
finance system following the Supreme Court of the United States’ Decision in Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). See generally ERIKA LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33377, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY RESTRICTIONS AND
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 25–27 (2007) (summarizing the current disclosure rules applicable
to such organizations).
3 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (“The Government may
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may
not suppress that speech altogether.”). See generally Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and
Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011); Outside Spending,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Jan. 11,
2012) (providing outside spending data for elections since 1990 broken down by political
affiliation, type of expenditure, degree of disclosure, organization, and electoral race).
4 See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act,
H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010) [hereinafter House DISCLOSE Act] (as passed by
House on June 24, 2010) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to add additional
disclosure requirements); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010) [hereinafter Senate DISCLOSE Act] (as
introduced in Senate on Apr. 30, 2010) (same); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech
of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–05
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The time is therefore ripe for a deeper consideration of the policy
concerns that underlie such public disclosure requirements and the
related issue of privacy. To clarify the discussion, one aspect for
deeper consideration is recognizing that this particular area is at the
intersection of three significantly different disclosure regimes. Those
three regimes are (1) federal tax law generally, (2) federal tax law as
it applies to tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, and (3) federal
election law. 5 These regimes are a study in contrasts. Federal tax law
strongly protects taxpayer information from public disclosure. And
while federal tax exemption law strongly favors public disclosure of
institutional information, it is more ambivalent about public
disclosure of information relating to individuals. In contrast, federal
election law strongly favors public disclosure of all relevant financial
information, including information relating to individuals.
Understanding the reasons for these differences is important to
determine whether disclosures at the intersection of the three regimes
are appropriate and desirable.
The other, related aspect of this deeper consideration is privacy.
The concept of privacy is one that is instantly recognizable and yet
theoretically, much less legally, hard to define.6 This difficulty stems
in part from the many possible applications of the privacy concept.
Fortunately for the purposes of this Article, the context here is fairly
clear and narrow: the public disclosure of information relating to
nonprofit organizations involved in politics and their supporters. Even
in this narrow context, however, there are at least two competing
approaches with respect to privacy. One takes a cost-benefit
approach. It judges disclosure requirements based on their

(2011) (proposing, among other things, disclosure of contributors and taxing politicking by noncharitable tax-exempt organizations whether or not they have net investment income); Donald
B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory
Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 439–47 (2011) (proposing that the Treasury issue regulations
to quickly reduce the manipulation of tax-exempt status, but preferring legislative action); Ciara
Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt
Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS
CHAP. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 89–91 (2010) (arguing that the absence of disclosure requirements
for contributions to section 501(c)(6) trade associations potentially damages corporate
shareholder value and opens the door to foreign-owned corporation campaign expenditures);
David Callahan, Op-Ed., Bring Donors Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A21
(arguing for public disclosure of contributions to political nonprofits).
5 Similar regimes exist at the state level, but discussion of the state tax and election laws
governing disclosure is beyond the scope of this article. See THE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE
PROJECT, http://www.campaigndisclosure.org (last updated Sept. 20, 2008) (providing overview
of state election laws relating to disclosure).
6 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of privacy in the
law).
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quantifiable costs and benefits, including among those costs the harm
to privacy, however measured. The other, less frequently used, is a
right-to-privacy approach that considers privacy a fundamental right
that can only be abridged if there is a relatively strong interest for
doing so and then only to the extent required to further that interest.
The first Part of this Article briefly reviews and contrasts the
history and current rules governing disclosure and privacy in the
federal tax, federal tax exemption, and federal election law contexts.
This review reveals that both the cost-benefit approach and the rightto-privacy approach can be found in this history, but to a greater or
lesser extent depending on the context. The second Part explores
these two different approaches and the extent to which the existing
disclosure rules reflect those approaches. This Part shows that the
rules are sometimes but not always based both on the cost-benefit
approach to disclosure, in which privacy harms are but one possible
cost, and on the right-to-privacy approach. The third Part considers
recent proposals for disclosure rules relating to nonprofit
organizations engaged in political activity using both the cost-benefit
approach and the right-to-privacy approach. This consideration
reveals that certain proposals, which relate to disclosure of financial
information primarily about the organizations themselves, generally
are justifiable under either approach. Certain other proposals that
would require disclosure of financial information primarily relating to
individuals, however, are more difficult to justify under a right-toprivacy approach. I conclude by discussing why this difference exists
and what it means for the desirability of disclosure in this area.
I. THREE DIFFERENT DISCLOSURE REGIMES
A tax-exempt nonprofit organization that engages in political
activities is potentially at the intersection of three significantly
different federal law disclosure regimes. Each of the regimes requires
the organization to disclose detailed financial information to the
government, including to a lesser or greater extent information about
other parties with which the organization has financial dealings.
While the exact financial information that must be disclosed varies,
the primary difference between them is whether the financial
information that is disclosed to the government is also revealed to the
public. This Part explores that aspect of each disclosure regime and
the apparent reasons why public disclosure is not always required.
First, however, a brief explanation is needed regarding how this
intersection came to be. As I have detailed elsewhere, federal election
law requires public disclosure of financial information by entities
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engaged in certain types of political (i.e., candidate supporting or
opposing) activity; these entities include candidate committees,
political parties, and political committees (i.e., PACs), and the
publicly disclosed information includes identifying information for
donors of any significant size. 7 To accommodate these entities in the
federal income tax system, Congress also created a separate
exemption category for organizations engaged in “political activities”
under Internal Revenue Code section 527 that have as their primary
activity supporting or opposing candidates.8 Because “political
activity” as defined by federal tax law is broader than the “political
activity” regulated by federal election law, it proved possible to create
“527 organizations” that were not covered by election law’s
disclosure rules, which subsequently became known as “stealth
PACs.” 9 To correct this gap in required public disclosures, Congress
amended federal tax law in 2000 to impose disclosure requirements
on these stealth organizations that essentially paralleled the election
law disclosure rules, including the public disclosure of information
identifying donors of any significant size.10
Under existing federal tax law, however, it is also possible for
other types of tax-exempt organizations to engage in many types of
political activity without becoming subject to either set of disclosure
rules as long as that political activity does not become the primary
activity of the organization.11 These tax-exempt organizations include
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section 501(c)(5) labor
unions, and section 501(c)(6) trade associations and chambers of
commerce. While this ability has existed for many years, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United appears to have triggered both a
new attention to it and a new flow of funds into these politically
active tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, with the sources of those
funds generally not subject to public disclosure. 12 This new attention
and new funds have led commentators and politicians to call for
7 Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV.
625, 633–34 (2007) (discussing the limits that federal election law places on contributions to
certain entities); id. at 636–37 (discussing the disclosure rules).
8 Id. at 639–40.
9 Id. at 645.
10 Id. at 646.
11 See Aprill, supra note 4, at 381–87 (discussing which nonprofit organizations are able
to engage in political activity as long as it does not become their primary activity); Tobin, supra
note 4, at 429–31(same). In contrast to these non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations,
charitable nonprofit organizations that are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) are not permitted
to engage in any political activity (i.e., any support or opposition of candidates). See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2006) (“[A]nd which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”).
12 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Citizens United
decision).
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increased disclosure of information, including information relating to
donors, about these organizations that sit at the intersection of the
disclosure rules found in federal tax law, federal tax exemption law,
and federal election law.13
A. Federal Tax Law Generally
The Treasury Department has broad authority to require taxpayers
to provide detailed financial information that would help the
government collect tax revenues. 14 The primary vehicle for providing
this information is the myriad of forms and schedules prepared by the
IRS and completed by taxpayers, a universe of paperwork that
continues to grow both as Treasury identifies additional information
that would aid in tax collection and as Congress enacts additional
reporting laws. 15 The Treasury Department also has the ability to
require taxpayers to keep extensive records that the IRS may demand
on audit, as well as to ask for relevant information from third
parties. 16
At the same time, however, the Internal Revenue Code sharply
limits the extent to which the IRS can share the information it
receives from taxpayers with not only the public, but even with other
governments and other federal government agencies. More
specifically, Internal Revenue Code section 6103 provides a general
rule that “[r]eturns and return information shall be confidential.”17 A
13 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing proposed bills and other commentary
that would require greater disclosure).
14 See I.R.C. § 6001 (“Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title . . . shall . . .
render such statements [and] make such returns” as the Treasury Department may prescribe);
I.R.C. § 6011(a) (requiring any person liable for tax to provide whatever information may be
required by forms or regulations prescribed by the Treasury Department).
15 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public
Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 479, 482 (1981) (“The history of the federal income tax
indicates the list of items [taxpayers must disclose to the IRS] will not shrink in the foreseeable
future; but, if anything, will grow longer.”); see also Forms and Instructions (PDF), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/formsInstructions.html (last visited Jan.
11, 2012) (listing 1,183 IRS forms and instructions for forms).
16 See I.R.C. § 6001 (requiring the keeping of records); I.R.C. § 7602(a) (authorizing the
examination of any records and the taking of any testimony relevant to determining liability for
federal tax).
17 I.R.C. § 6103(a). While prior to amendment of this statute in 1976 tax records were in
theory public records, in practice executive orders and other executive branch rules generally
protected tax information from public but not intra-government disclosure. See I STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY
AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 127 (2000) [hereinafter JCT REPORT
vol. I] (arguing need for tax return confidentiality is demonstrated by privacy breaches during
the Watergate era); S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 315–16 (1976) (outlining public record status of
income tax returns law prior to Tax Reform Act of 1976); 1 OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS 20–21 (2000)
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“return” is defined broadly as “any tax or information return,
declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund . . . .” 18 Similarly,
“return information” includes essentially all financial information
relating to a taxpayer.19 This confidentiality provision is backed by
both civil and criminal penalties not only on government employees
who make unauthorized disclosures, but also on other persons who republish information received through an unauthorized disclosure.20
There are a variety of exceptions to this general rule, primarily
with respect to sharing information with certain other federal
government agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, and
with state tax agencies. 21 Public disclosure of returns or return
information, other than in an aggregate form, is generally prohibited
except for a narrow exception relating to obtaining needed
information from third parties and for when a taxpayer chooses to
contest a tax liability in court.22 IRS materials confirm the importance
of maintaining the confidentiality of this information. For example,
one publication states that the Internal Revenue Code “makes the

[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT] (detailing relationship between two executive orders issued by
President Nixon and Congressional concern over tax privacy); T. Keith Fogg, Transparency in
Private Collection of Federal Taxes, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 763, 770–71 (2011) (describing history
of federal tax disclosure); David Lenter, Douglas Shackelford & Joel Slemrod, Public
Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal
Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803, 813 (2003) (reviewing development of confidentiality
rules); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 885–86 (2008)
(describing judicial, executive, and legislative roles in defining historical extent of tax privacy).
18 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1).
19 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2).
20 See I.R.C. § 7213 (making unauthorized disclosure of return or return information,
including republication of such information by any person when the disclosure was not
permitted, a felony); I.R.C. § 7431 (imposing civil liability on the United States for prohibited
disclosures or, if the prohibited disclosure is by a person who is not an employee of the United
States, the person making the disclosure); see generally JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at
56–58 (discussing the imposition of criminal and civil liability for unauthorized disclosure);
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 25–26 (same).
21 I.R.C. § 6103(d)–(l) (2006 & Supp. III 2009 & Supp. IV 2010); see also JCT REPORT
vol. I, supra note 17, at 27–55 (discussing permissible disclosures by IRS); TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 17, at 42–66 (same); James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax
Returns: The Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
940, 964–982 (1979) (discussing various government officials’ access to confidential tax return
information).
22 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4) (providing for disclosures in judicial proceedings); id. at (k)(6)
(providing for disclosures for investigative purposes); see also Bittker, supra note 15, at 490–91
(noting that while “taxpayers who wish to litigate their tax liabilities must open the relevant
facts to judicial, and hence to public, inspection,” disclosure of taxpayer information to
members of the general public is generally not permitted). For a discussion of some of the
emerging disclosure issues relating to tax information, see Christopher S. Rizek, Taxpayer
Privacy and Disclosure Issues Will Continue to Touch Us All, in TAX NOTES: 30TH
ANNIVERSARY EDITION 81 (2002).
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confidential relationship between the taxpayer and the IRS quite
clear.” 23
A 2000 Joint Committee on Taxation staff report that
comprehensively reviewed the disclosure provisions in the federal tax
laws summarized the policy reasons for these rules: “This
confidentiality is based on persons’ right to privacy, as well as the
view that voluntary compliance will be increased if taxpayers know
that the information they provide to the government will not become
public.” 24 That is, these rules exist both to protect privacy as a right
enjoyed by taxpayers and for pragmatic reasons relating to
maximizing the collection of tax revenues owed. The report goes on
to detail reasons why the narrow exceptions summarized above
exist. 25 In fact, the Joint Committee on Taxation staff strongly
recommended against granting any additional access to returns or
return information absent a “compelling need for the disclosure that
clearly outweighs the privacy interests of the taxpayer.” 26
B. Federal Tax Law for Tax-Exempt Organizations
Federal tax law also governs the disclosure of financial and other
information provided to the IRS by organizations exempt from federal
income tax. 27 In contrast to the general disclosure rules, the rules for
tax-exempt organizations’ information strongly favor public
disclosure, except in relatively limited circumstances. While taxexempt organizations have not always had to disclose financial
information—and some are still not required to do so—once they
were forced to provide it to the IRS, the information also became
subject to mandatory public disclosure. 28
23 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX INFORMATION SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL,
STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES (PUB. 1075), at 12 (2010).
24 JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 5; see also id. at 127–28 (noting that a degree of
confidentiality is necessary for effective tax law); TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 33
(explaining how reasonable and continuing expectation of privacy is central to taxpayer
concerns).
25 See JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 129–32 (detailing certain exceptions to
general rule of confidentiality); supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that public
disclosure of returns or return information is not permitted except in relatively narrow
circumstances).
26 JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 6; see also id. at 196–97 (discussing the Joint
Committee on Taxation staff’s recommendation regarding disclosure of returns or return
information).
27 See generally Susan L. Paul & Bill Brockner, Disclosure, FOIA and the Privacy Act, in
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS-TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 (2002), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc03.pdf (discussing application of privacy laws to the
IRS by governmental agencies).
28 See II JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th Cong., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE
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Tax-exempt organizations provide information to the IRS
primarily through two channels. First, some organizations provide
information when seeking IRS recognition of their tax-exempt
status—a requirement for most charitable organizations other than
churches and certain church-related entities, but an option for other
types of tax-exempt organizations. 29 The information on those
organizations’ application forms and related submissions are available
to the public.30 Initially that availability was only through the IRS, but
more recently Congress chose to require the organizations themselves
to provide access to these documents upon request.31
The other channel is the annual information return that almost all
tax-exempt organizations—the major exception again being churches
and certain church-related entities—have to file with the IRS. 32 The
amount of information that organizations need to provide on some
version of the IRS Form 990 varies depending on the financial size of
the organization, but in general the information on whatever return is
filed is available to the public. 33 As with the application, the return
initially was only available from the IRS, but more recently Congress
chose to require organizations themselves to provide copies of recent
returns upon request. 34 This information is also now widely available
because of a private organization that made arrangements with the
IRS to obtain electronic copies of all annual information returns and
post them on the Internet. 35 Congress has even extended public
disclosure to the annual form tax-exempt organizations use to report
taxable income from trades or business conducted but that are
unrelated to the purpose that provides the basis for the organizations’
tax-exempt status. 36

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, at 124 (2000)
[hereinafter JCT REPORT vol. II] (discussing the historical context of the reporting requirements
and obligations of tax-exempt organizations); Fogg, supra note 17, at 799–800 (explaining the
basis for requiring reporting by tax-exempt organizations).
29 See I.R.C. § 508(a), (c) (2006) (requiring new organizations to notify the Secretary of
tax-exempt registration unless they are a church).
30 See I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (making applications for tax-exempt
organizations available to public inspection at the IRS).
31 See I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(B) (outlining the classes of organizations that
must make tax-exemption documents available upon request).
32 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1), (a)(3).
33 See I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(1)(A)(i) (providing for inspection of the annual returns).
34 I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(i).
35 See GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (providing
information about tax-exempt organizations including annual reports).
36 See I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring disclosure of all returns filed under section
6011 by 501(c)(3) organization).
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While the information provided by tax-exempt organizations to the
IRS is generally subject to public disclosure, there are some
exceptions. Probably the most significant exception relates to
information that identifies an organization’s donors. The Internal
Revenue Code requires most tax-exempt organizations to disclose
some identifying information regarding contributors to the IRS, but
the IRS is not authorized to disclose that information to the public nor
are the organizations themselves required to provide that information
to the public; the only organizations for which this limitation on
public disclosure does not apply are private foundations and political
organizations. 37 Private foundations are generally charitable
organizations that initially are funded by a single donor or a small
group of often related donors and are usually controlled by that donor
or the donor’s family members. 38 The public disclosure of the donors’
identities is one part of a larger set of provisions designed to limit the
influence of donors to private foundations based on Congress’s
perception that these entities were particularly susceptible to abuse
through misuse of their charitable assets by their financial
supporters. 39 Political organizations are groups that primarily seek to
influence the election of candidates. 40 Requiring disclosure of their
even relatively modest contributors is based on the reasons discussed
in Part I.C that support public disclosure of contributors to candidates,
political parties, and political committees. 41
Three other more limited exceptions to the public disclosure of
information provided to the IRS on an application or annual
information return also exist. One is an exception for identifying
information for individual—but not organizational or government—
grant recipients.42 Another is an exception for information that would
I.R.C. § 6104(b), (d)(3)(A).
See I.R.C. § 509(a) (defining a private foundation).
39 See I.R.C. §§ 4940–4946 (2006 & Supp. I) (imposing various taxes on private
foundations for actions that are inconsistent with the foundations charitable purpose). See
generally Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its
Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000) (recounting the history of
abuse of charitable and other tax-exempt organizations).
40 See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)–(2) (defining a political organization and an exempt function);
see also supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text (discussing “political” organizations).
41 See Fogg, supra note 17, at 803 (information disclosure with respect to political
organizations is “more to benefit campaign finance law than to promote tax disclosure”); see
generally Mayer, supra note 7, at 637–48 (explaining the justification for and treatment of
political activity by tax-exempt organizations).
42 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 SCHEDULE I GRANTS AND OTHER
ASSISTANCE TO ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990si.pdf (showing Part II as relating to
organization and government grant recipients requires identifying information, while Part III
relating to individual grant recipients does not).
37
38
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reveal trade secrets or information which could adversely affect the
national defense. 43 Finally, an organization can refuse to provide
copies of information upon request if the organization can
demonstrate it is the subject of a harassment campaign and that
compliance with the request is not in the public interest. 44 This
exception does not, however, prevent the party seeking the
information from obtaining it through other means, including through
public inspection of documents at the organization’s offices. 45
Outside of these narrow exceptions, and the broader exception for
identifying information for donors, the information provided by taxexempt organizations on these forms is otherwise accessible to the
public.
That said, certain other information relating to tax-exempt
nonprofit organizations is not subject to public disclosure. While
private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and other tax
documents relating to specific organizations are publicly available,
identifying information is redacted from the public copies of such
documents, as is the case for all taxpayers. 46 Similarly, the progress
and results of examinations with respect to specific tax-exempt
nonprofit organizations is not publicly available or even available to
an individual or organization that filed a complaint with the IRS that
may have triggered the examination.47 The one exception is if the
examination results in revocation of the organization’s tax-exempt
status, in which case the fact of the revocation is publicly
announced. 48 These limits on public disclosure appear, however, to
represent simply an application of the general bias toward
confidentiality in the federal tax laws as opposed to a conscious
decision by Congress or the Treasury to protect the confidentiality of
such information for tax-exempt nonprofits. 49
I.R.C. § 6104(a)(1)(D), (d)(3)(B).
I.R.C. § 6104(d)(4).
45 See id. (applying only to the provision of copies upon request).
46 See I.R.C. § 6110(c) (detailing the personal information that must be deleted before the
Treasury Secretary makes a disclosure); JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 37–41
(explaining the disclosure and privacy protections codified in section 6110(c)); TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 17, at 27 (explaining section 6110 redaction policies and how to challenge
the redactions); Fogg, supra note 17, at 775–76 (explaining the history of the disclosure
provision).
47 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 84–85 (“Present law does not provide for the
disclosure of information relating to the audit of a tax-exempt organization.”).
48 See Rev. Proc. 82–39, 1982–2 C.B. 759, § 3.01 (providing that if “the Service
subsequently revokes a ruling or a determination letter previously issued to it, contributions
made to the organization by persons unaware of the change in the status of the organization
generally will be considered allowable if made on or before the date of an appropriate public
announcement”).
49 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 40–41, 83–85 (noting several exceptions to
43
44
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The Joint Committee on Taxation staff’s 2000 report mentioned
previously also discussed the disclosure rules applicable to taxexempt organizations.50 The report recognized that tax-exempt
organizations have a right to privacy. 51 The committee’s staff
concluded, however, that the public’s interests in ensuring that
organizations receiving significant tax benefits in fact qualified for
those benefits and in having access to information about potential
recipients of their donations generally outweighed this right.52
Consistent with that conclusion, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s
staff recommended greater public disclosure of information about taxexempt organizations, including information relating to all written
determinations and closing agreements that resolve audits.53 The
report’s conclusion regarding disclosure in this context is striking in
its contrast to the Joint Committee on Taxation staff’s above-quoted
statement relating to taxpayer information more generally: “The Joint
Committee staff believes that disclosure of information regarding taxexempt organizations is appropriate unless there are compelling
reasons for nondisclosure that clearly outweigh the public interest in
disclosure.” 54
C. Federal Election Law
Money has been an essential element in politics since time
immemorial. At the same time, the possibility of money granting
improper influence over government decisions and particularly over
who governs has also been a perennial concern. One of the primary
tools for addressing this concern in the United States has been
required disclosure of the financial supporters of candidates, parties,
and other political organizations to both the government and the
public. The effect of such disclosure on those supporters is to reveal
information about both their finances—at least with respect to how
much they can afford to spend on political contributions—and their
political views.
Current law requires disclosure of detailed identifying information
regarding those who provide financial support to others that engage in

the section 6110 framework that prevent disclosure but recommending that the present law be
revised with respect to tax-exempt organizations to provide for more disclosure).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 5, 62.
52 Id. at 5–6, 63.
53 Id. at 7, 83–86.
54 Id. at 80. For the committee’s more general view on taxpayer information, see supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
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politics, such others including candidates, entities, and individuals
that engage in politics themselves. 55 Relatively small contributions or
expenditures trigger such disclosure, even at the federal level—
amounts as low as $201 in some situations.56 Thanks to technological
advances, it is now relatively easy to access this information, whether
through the Federal Election Commission’s database 57 or through
private databases that provide access to the same information. 58
The reasons for this disclosure are commonly stated in pure costbenefit terms—whether the benefits of such knowledge to the
political process and to the public outweigh the costs to those whose
information is disclosed.59 This may be in part because that is how the
constitutional debate over such provisions is framed. The Supreme
Court has stated that the constitutional standard is “exacting
scrutiny,” which requires a “sufficiently important governmental
interest” with which the disclosure requirement has a “substantial
relation.” 60 Once one or more particular governmental interests have
been identified as sufficiently important, however, the Court appears
to have essentially weighed the benefits from that interest or interests
being furthered against the costs of disclosure to the affected parties.61
Even Justice Thomas, who is the most skeptical member of the Court
with respect to the constitutional viability of disclosure requirements,
based his argument on what he believes is a more accurate view of the
costs of disclosure than the other Justices acknowledge, rather than on
a fundamental right to privacy. 62

55 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006) (providing reporting requirements for political
committees).
56 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5)(A), (c)(2)(C), (f)(2)(C) (requiring the disclosure
of names and addresses of all individuals who donate over $200 in certain situations).
57 Disclosure
Data
Search,
FED.
ELECTION
COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure_data_search.shtml (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
58 E.g., Huffpost Fundrace, HUFFINGTON POST, http://fundrace.huffingtonpost.com (last
visited Jan. 11, 2012).
59 See infra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of this balancing done by
the Supreme Court).
60 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (collecting cases);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (laying out the constitutional standard affirmed in
Citizens United).
61 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–17 (discussing and rejecting the arguments
offered by Citizens United, which argued that the disclosure rules were unconstitutional as
applied to it); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196–98 (2003) (citing the district court’s opinion
weighing the competing First Amendment interests); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68, 71–72 (noting
that the Court must look to the “extent of the burden that [disclosure requirements] place on
individual rights”); see also infra notes 106–107 and accompanying text (further developing this
point).
62 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

2/13/2012 3:37:51 PM

814

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

In most instances that weighing has tilted toward disclosure, even
though the evidence of both benefits and costs is relatively thin. 63 In
some specific instances, however, the costs to a particular group have
been well enough established, or the benefits to the public are so
ephemeral, that the courts conclude disclosure is constitutionally
barred. For example, the Socialist Workers Party successfully
litigated and then renewed an exemption from disclosure based on
documented harassment of its members and supporters—i.e.,
significant costs. 64 Margaret McIntyre, who distributed anonymous
leaflets that opposed a local tax, successfully defended her anonymity
in part because the benefits in terms of increased information to
voters were minimal given her relative obscurity. 65
Even critics of most campaign finance restrictions, who primarily
rely on a relatively strong and absolutist reading of the First
Amendment’s free speech clause, have usually been willing to
support disclosure as the preferable (and constitutional) means of
combating corruption and the appearance of corruption in elections
based on essentially a cost-benefit analysis. 66 Moreover, there is an
argument that because the effect of disclosure is in large part to
publicly identify the political leanings of the persons subject to
disclosure, there is no real privacy interest to protect since revealing a
contributor’s leanings is simply “civic courage.” And so presumably
the individual involved does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 67 But some commentators have flagged the fact that the
extensive disclosure requirements in this area of law are inconsistent
with a right to privacy that would require more than a balancing of
measurable costs and benefits to justify disclosure. 68 Nevertheless,
63 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 270, 280
(2010) (arguing neither the voter information benefits nor the retaliation and fear of retaliation
costs have strong evidentiary support).
64 See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982) (finding
a reasonable probability that the disclosure provisions of an Ohio law would subject the
taxpayer to harassment); FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVISORY OPINION 2009–01, at 1, 10–
11 (2009), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (renewing the Socialist Worker’s
Party’s exemption from disclosure rules based on the probability of harassment).
65 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995).
66 See, e.g., STEPHANIE D. MOUSSALLI, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE CASE FOR
DEREGULATION 20–21 (1990) (arguing disclosure laws can be justified by the benefits of
greater voter information); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 311, 326–27 (arguing that mandatory disclosure of contributors to political
campaigns supported by democratic accountability benefits outweigh any inhibition of speech or
other costs).
67 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09–
559) (Scalia, J.) (commenting on disclosure in the context of ballot initiative petition signers).
68 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 19–20 (2003) [hereinafter McGeveran,
Checkbook] (arguing that “[f]orced revelations are intrusions into a sphere of personal liberty”);
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both the constitutional and policy discussions have been dominated to
date by such a balancing approach.
The different bases and underlying policy reasons for the
disclosure rules in these three contexts intersect at one question: to
what extent should politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations be required to disclose both their political activities and
the identities of their financial supporters. How to answer this
question depends, therefore, to a large extent on whether this context
is viewed more as one that is election-related, where disclosure is
strongly favored; tax-related, where disclosure is strongly disfavored;
or nonprofit-related, where disclosure relating to the nonprofit itself is
strongly favored but disclosure relating to other parties, particularly
individuals, is viewed with more ambivalence.
More fundamentally, the above analysis of the reasons for these
different disclosure rules reveals two distinct approaches to disclosure
and privacy. One approach, dominant in the general tax law context
and almost invisible in the election law context, is that privacy is an
intrinsic right that can only be infringed upon by public disclosure of
otherwise private information in the most compelling of situations.
The other approach, found in all three contexts but especially
dominant in the election law context, is that what matters is a
balancing of concrete costs and benefits in which privacy harm is
only one cost (and a difficult to measure and generally minimized one
at that). Part II examines these two different approaches more
carefully, drawing on the broader privacy scholarship.
II. TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PRIVACY
The issue of privacy has caused significant confusion in legal
scholarship. 69 On one hand, scholars for the most part agree with the
general intuition that there is a right to privacy distinct from other

William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 861 (2011) [hereinafter McGeveran, Persona] (arguing that
“the interest in anonymous political participation should not be anchored only in effectsoriented reasoning that demands a danger of imminent physical or financial harm”); Bradley A.
Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105
YALE L.J. 1049, 1071 n.139 (1996) (noting that disclosure laws raise “serious First Amendment
questions”).
69 See, e.g., HILARY DELANY & EOIN C AROLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: A DOCTRINAL
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ix (2008) (acknowledging “the essential elusiveness of the right
to privacy”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“Privacy, however, is a
concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.”); David Lindsay, An Exploration of
the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law,
29 MELB. U. L. REV. 131, 135 (2005) (“The concept of privacy . . . . is an ‘elusive’ concept that
is difficult to define in a satisfactory manner.”).
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legal rights, a right which the law should recognize and protect. 70 On
the other hand, scholars have struggled to develop a coherent theory
regarding the extent of this right and how strongly the law should
protect it. 71 In large part, this struggle can be traced to the fact that the
idea of “privacy” applies in many different contexts and in many
different ways. 72
But there are some universal privacy concepts. One set of such
concepts is the difference between a cost-benefit approach and a
right-to-privacy approach. 73 As this Part details, the former approach
is characterized by an attempt to compare the resulting costs and
benefits from infringing privacy. The latter perspective is
characterized by privacy as a right that is fundamental to individuals
and so can only be infringed upon if there are sufficiently important
reasons for doing so.
Full consideration of these two different approaches would be a
mammoth task. Fortunately, the context to which these approaches
apply is relatively limited, and so the discussion of them can be
70 See, e.g., BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 67–68 (R.D.V. Glasgow trans.,
Polity Press 2005) (2001) (rejecting reductionist approaches to privacy); Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (arguing that “privacy is indeed a distinct
and coherent concept”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236
(1977) (relying on “two purportedly shared intuitions—one normative and the other descriptive:
first, that we have some common commitment to the value of what is private in our lives; and,
second, that we have some common conception of what in our lives in fact is private”); Lindsay,
supra note 69, at 144–45 (rejecting reductionist approaches to privacy). But see Judith Jarvis
Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 312–13 (1975) (arguing that privacy
is a cluster of other rights as opposed to a coherent right in itself). Historically, the legal right to
privacy is generally traced to an 1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). For examples of scholars tracing the right to privacy to Warren and Brandeis’s
article, see SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 15; Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A
Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (1990); Lindsay, supra note 69,
at 140.
71 See SOLOVE, supra note 6969, at 1 (“Philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have
frequently lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy.”);
Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
371, 371 (2003) (“The meaning of privacy . . . has proven elusive.”).
72 See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 4–5 (2d ed. 2011) (listing six
different senses in which privacy is discussed legally); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 6–7
(describing three uses of privacy; relating to action and conduct, to certain knowledge, and to
spaces, as well as five groups of definitions of the word “privacy”); Kahn, supra note 71, at 409
(“Attempts to classify and define the right to privacy are . . . defeated by the underlying needs to
diversity [sic] and split the concept so as to make it less broad.”); see generally SOLOVE, supra
note 69, at 8–11 (proposing a “taxonomy of privacy,” which consists of four principal groups).
73 See generally DELANY & C AROLAN, supra note 69, at 12–16 (contrasting
consequentialist and deontological theories of privacy); Ronald A. Cass, Privacy and Legal
Rights, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 867, 868–69, 871–72 (1991) (contrasting a deontological
approach to privacy with a case-by-case intuitive approach that tends to draw on a cost-benefits
analysis); Lindsay, supra note 69, at 144 (arguing that if privacy is accepted as a coherent
concept, there is then a distinction between consequentialist and deontological approaches to
privacy).
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similarly limited.74 More specifically in the context here, what is
private is financial information, and particularly financial information
that tends to reveal (imperfectly) both the financial status of certain
entities and individuals and their political leanings. 75 Furthermore, the
infringement on privacy is with respect to disclosure to the public, as
disclosure to the government is already a given in this context.
A. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Privacy
One common approach to privacy is the well-known practice of
comparing the measurable benefits of the relevant action against the
measurable costs of that action. In the privacy context, the baseline or
neutral state is when privacy is maintained while the action or change
at issue is infringing on that privacy through disclosure. Difficulties
with quantifying the benefits and costs of disclosure, however, often
complicate the use of this approach.
1. In Theory
Turning to the baseline first, in the privacy context the baseline is
generally the state of affairs absent legally compelled disclosure.
Relevant, therefore, is whether the information at stake is already
known to more people than the individual or entity making the
privacy claim, including whether that information is already in some
sense public. 76 The baseline can, however, instead be a particular
level of compelled disclosure that is taken as a given, with the
infringing action being a broader level of disclosure whether with
respect to what is disclosed or to whom disclosure is made.77
Benefits can vary from the highly concrete to the highly
speculative. Common benefits cited from compelled disclosure
include more informed decision making by those receiving the
otherwise private information, prevention or deterrence of specific
harms, and enhanced enforcement of other laws. 78 In many
74 This Article, therefore, ignores the many privacy applications and issues that arise in
other contexts. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 101–70 (discussing privacy issues in
the context of four different conceptions of privacy).
75 See ALLEN, supra note 72, at 4 (discussing “informational” intrusions as one form of
privacy invasion); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 9 (same).
76 See SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 22 (noting that if privacy is viewed, as it is in a variety
of legal contexts, as secrecy, that “often leads to the conclusion that once a fact is publicly
divulged . . . it can no longer remain private”).
77 See DELANY & C AROLAN, supra note 699, at 24–25 (arguing that an all-or-nothing
approach to the right to privacy is an “analytical mis-step”); SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 23 (“The
privacy-as-secrecy conception fails to recognize that individuals want to keep things private
from some people but not others.”).
78 See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
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circumstances there are limited data quantifying such benefits,
thereby requiring reliance on educated guesses and intuition to
determine a sense of the benefits’ magnitude. 79
As for costs, these can also vary significantly. A common cost of
compelled disclosure includes actions by those to whom information
was disclosed, such as retaliation or harassment, which negatively
impact the individual or entity subject to disclosure. Other costs are
the related “chilling” effect on the activities or choices of the
individual or entity subject to disclosure and reduced transparency or
honesty in the disclosure, both of which harm the individual, entity,
or society more generally. 80 As with benefits, quantifying such costs
is often quite challenging. 81
Because both benefits and costs can be difficult to quantify, the
final, balancing step of the analysis can in many cases be suspect as a
“garbage in, garbage out” situation. Yet sometimes a clear result—
favoring or disfavoring disclosure—can be reached because even
given some uncertainty the overall balance is clear. In many other
situations, however, the result is less clear. And the question arises of
whether privacy or disclosure should be the default result in the face
of such uncertainty.
2. In Practice
In all three of the contexts at issue here the disclosure decision has
been based at least in part on a cost-benefit approach. But that
approach has resulted in three very different results. In the general tax
context, it has tended to reinforce a right-to-privacy conclusion that
privacy should be favored over disclosure. In the tax-exempt
nonprofit context, it is the second step of analysis after the conclusion
has been reached, based on more fundamental concerns, that
disclosure should be favored over privacy. That second step becomes
the basis for the limited exceptions from otherwise required
disclosure. Finally, in the election law context the cost-benefit
approach has been the primary and indeed usually the only approach

TRANSPARENCY 6 (2007) (describing the informed decision making and reducing risks benefits
of disclosure).
79 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 69, at 87–88 (discussing how the benefits and costs of
privacy can be difficult to quantify); Mayer, supra note 633, at 256–57 (finding such flaws in
the election law disclosure context).
80 See SOLOVE, supra note 699, at 79–80, 88 (listing the benefits of privacy that could be
harmed by disclosure).
81 See supra note 79 (citing commentators who argue that the costs and benefits of privacy
are hard to quantify).
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taken, leading to a strong bias toward disclosure because the benefits
have generally been considered significantly greater than the costs
except in very limited situations.
With respect to the general tax rules, the baseline for consideration
of costs and benefits has in recent times been disclosure to the IRS
but not beyond (even to other government agencies).82 The reason for
accepting this baseline is relatively clear—without disclosure of
taxpayer financial information to the IRS, whether from taxpayers
directly or from third parties, underpayment of taxes owed would
almost certainly be rampant and substantial. This assumption is
supported not only by common sense, but by the fact that such
underpayment is still a significant problem where third-party
verification of taxpayer submitted information is not available.83
Absent general IRS access to taxpayer financial information,
underpayment would almost certainly become an enormous problem.
So given the existence of a federal income tax system, disclosure of
taxpayer financial information to the government is necessary for that
system to function.
Working from that baseline, consideration of benefits and costs of
disclosing taxpayer information publicly has generally been limited to
the effect of disclosure on the primary goal of the federal tax
system—raising revenues for the federal government consistent with
the existing tax laws. 84 Focusing on this goal, the only cost-benefit
question that Congress and commentators have tended to ask is
whether such disclosure would enhance or inhibit the collection of the
correct amount of revenues. 85
82 See JCT REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 256 (providing the historical backdrop to the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, which made tax return information confidential); Marc Linder, Tax
Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy
Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 966 (1991) (noting that the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 codified the prohibition of disclosure to the general public, but did not reverse the
trend toward intragovernmental disclosure); Robert P. Strauss, State Disclosure of Tax Return
Information: Taxpayer Privacy Versus the Public’s Right to Know, 5 ST. TAX NOTES 24, 26
(1993) (discussing the considerations that influenced Congress’ decision in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976).
83 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–06–208T, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE
STRATEGIES, BETTER COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 6 (2005) (showing that the misreporting of income is greatest in areas
with little or no third party reporting).
84 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 822, at 28 (discussing the efficacy of state disclosure laws
in terms of their propensity to encourage compliance with the tax laws).
85 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 318 (1976) (regarding disclosure to other government
agencies, the Senate Finance Committee “tried to balance the particular office or agency’s need
for the information involved with the citizen’s right to privacy and the related impact of
disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with our country’s voluntary assessment
system”); Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV.
539, 590 (2009) (concluding that disclosure of corporate involvement in abusive tax shelters is
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Their conclusion has generally been that such disclosure would
inhibit the collection of the correct amount of revenues because the
tax system is dependent on taxpayers accurately reporting their
financial information on their tax returns, and such accuracy can only
be partially verified through third-party information reporting and
IRS audits. 86 The reasoning is that if taxpayers knew the information
they reported would be publicly available and so could be used by
others—family members, employers, business partners, vendors,
scam artists, etc.—in a manner that would disadvantage the taxpayers,
they would be much less likely to report truthful information on their
returns. 87 There also may be a risk that such disclosure would actually
reveal widespread noncompliance, with the perverse effect that
compliance would decrease as taxpayers realize the ineffectiveness of
government enforcement.88
So while the reason for this conclusion can be traced to possible
harm to taxpayers, it ultimately is based primarily not on the
magnitude of that harm itself. Rather, the conclusion is instead rooted
in the perceived magnitude of that harm’s effect on the collection of
the correct amount of revenue. Similarly, proposals to publicly
disclose tax information for corporations depend at least in part on
whether doing so will enhance or inhibit the collection of the correct
amount of revenue. 89 While this issue is not the only one that is
relevant to such proposals, it is a critical one.90

not advisable because it would not deter such involvement and would potentially adversely
affect other aspects of tax compliance).
86 See S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 317 (asking “the question of whether the public’s reaction to
possible abuse of privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country’s very
successful voluntary assessment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax system”); JCT
REPORT vol. I, supra note 17, at 128 (noting that the degree of compliance is related to the
degree of confidentiality of information provided to the IRS).
87 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 34 (providing examples of how disclosure of
return information could result in under- and over-reporting of income).
88 See Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 22) (noting that tax privacy allows the government to selectively release
information about tax enforcement resulting in an inflated public perception of the
government’s ability to ensure compliance with the tax laws, thereby increasing actual
compliance); Schwartz, supra note 17, at 889–90 (presenting Italy as an example of when the
government released information over the internet to support tax compliance but the opposite
happened as people realized the government’s inability to enforce tax collection).
89 See Lenter, Shackelford, & Slemrod, supra note 17, at 820–21, 827 (discussing
proposals that would require the disclosure of corporate tax return information).
90 Id. at 827; see also Fogg, supra note 17, at 809–10 (proposing public disclosure of
information about taxes collected by private entities and held in trust for the government
because such funds are held in public trust and because disclosure would improve tax
collection).
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In the tax-exempt nonprofit context the baseline is instead
disclosure to both the IRS and the public. The reasons for the
disclosure to the IRS aspect of the baseline are fairly obvious—absent
detailed financial and activity reporting to the IRS, there would be a
strong incentive to create purportedly tax-exempt nonprofits that did
not in fact qualify for the exemption because the misclassification
would only be exposed in the relatively rare event of an IRS audit.
Interestingly, however, for many years nonprofits claiming exemption
did not have to apply for such status (and non-charitable nonprofits
still are not required to apply) or file annual returns documenting their
continued eligibility for such status.91 Starting in the middle of the
twentieth century, however, Congress realized the potential for abuse
that this lack of filings created and gradually expanded the required
disclosure to the IRS. 92 Now most charities have to file such
applications and most nonprofits claiming exemption have to file an
annual information return, although the amount of information they
are required to provide on the annual return varies depending on their
financial size. 93 The only major exception to both requirements is for
churches and certain church-related entities. 94 This exception
presumably arises not from generic privacy concerns, but instead
from concerns relating to First Amendment free exercise of religion
and entanglement issues.
For nonprofit organizations, the baseline is disclosure to the public
because of the public’s interest in knowing whether organizations that
claim tax benefits are in fact qualified. 95 While usually not stated
explicitly, a related rationale is that by claiming such benefits,
nonprofit organizations are voluntarily choosing to allow the
information they provide to the IRS to also be revealed to the
public. 96 It could be argued for organizations in existence at the time
91 See I.R.C. § 6033(a) (2006) (identifying which organizations must file annual returns);
JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 24 (outlining different organizations that do not have to
apply for status claiming exemption or file annual returns under Tax Reform Act of 1969).
92 See H.R. REP. NO. 91–418, pt. 1, at 36 (1969) (detailing the primary purpose of annual
reporting requirements as ensuring enforcement of the tax laws, and finding that “more
information is needed, on a more current basis, from more organizations”); id. at 38 (noting that
the lack of required applications means “Congress and the [IRS] are handicapped in evaluating
and administering existing law”); S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 52 (1969) (“[M]ore information is
needed on a more current basis for more organizations . . . .”); id. at 54 (noting that the lack of
required applications means “the [IRS] has been handicapped in evaluating and administering
existing laws”).
93 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the information that
is required to be on annual information returns.
94 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A).
95 See supra note 522, 92 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that information
about nonprofit organizations is disclosed to the public).
96 See Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1318
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the disclosure rules went into effect that this is a false choice, as loss
of the previously claimed tax benefits could have, in many cases,
been financially devastating. But certainly new organizations are on
notice of the now existing disclosure rules before they claim these
benefits. The baseline of both IRS and public disclosure, therefore,
makes particular sense for new entities, although it can be justified for
all organizations claiming tax-exempt status.
Working from this baseline, the primary role of cost-benefit
analysis is not to reinforce the conclusion favoring disclosure that
more fundamental considerations support, although it may do so. 97
Rather, the analysis is used primarily to identify situations in which
an exception from the public disclosure rules should be granted
because the benefits of permitting an exception outweigh its costs. In
that role, however, the analysis also sometimes reinforces the support
for exceptions that arguably are based on a fundamental right to
privacy approach.
For example, the general rule that information identifying donors
is not subject to public disclosure reflects both of these strands. The
vast majority of donors to tax-exempt nonprofits are individuals and
revealing their identities would disclose both information about their
financial resources and their charitable preferences that often are not
otherwise publicly available. 98 Doing so would therefore conflict with
a fundamental (and individual) right to privacy, as described below.
At the same time, this exception is also often justified because it has
minimal costs in terms of reduced compliance with the requirements
for tax exemption. And, conversely, it promotes the significant

(S.D. Ala. 2002) (relying on this argument to conclude that disclosure requirements relating to
contributions to I.R.C. § 527 political organizations were constitutional), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
2003).
97 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–05–561T, TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR:
GOVERNANCE, TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT ARE CRITICAL FOR MAINTAINING PUBLIC
TRUST 12–13 (2005) (stating that “[public disclosure] can both enhance incentives for ethical
and effective operations and support public oversight of tax-exempt entities”); Evelyn Brody,
Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure of Forms 990 and IRS
Determinations 3 (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/speakers/docs/brody-disclosure-Sugarman.pdf
(citing
statements that public disclosure increases legal compliance). But see Dana Brakman Reiser,
There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit
Reform, 80 CHI. KENT L. REV. 559, 601–05 (2005) (expressing skepticism that increased public
disclosure of nonprofit organization information will increase enforcement of legal obligations);
Robert A. Britton, Note, Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit Sector, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (same with respect to legal compliance generally).
98 See KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 78 (2008)
(illustrating that in 2006, $223 billion of the $295 billion in private contributions to nonprofit
organizations, or 75 percent, came from living individuals).
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benefit of encouraging donations, which helps the donee organization
and supports the purpose of the charitable contribution deduction, i.e.,
encouraging donations. 99 Where the costs of such an exception are
viewed as more substantial in terms of inhibiting compliance with the
restrictions on tax-exempt organizations, however, such as is arguably
the case with donors to private foundations or with respect to
information regarding executive compensation, then the analysis tilts
the other way and public disclosure applies.100
Finally, in the election law context the baseline also is generally
disclosure to the government (here the Federal Election Commission).
Historically, this baseline has been justified by three important
governmental interests: (1) knowing about financial contributions to
candidates, political parties, and other political players to prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption; (2) knowing about
financial contributions to enable the government to enforce the
various limits on contributions and other political expenditures; and
(3) informing voters. 101
The reasoning and result of the Citizens United decision, however,
weakened the first two interests with respect to independent
expenditures. The Court diluted the first interest by concluding that
the government only had a compelling interest in preventing
corruption via quid pro quo arrangements, which the Court further
concluded was not a concern with respect to expenditures made
independently of candidates and political parties.102 But as a policy
matter the government could still have an interest, albeit a less than
compelling one in the Court’s view, in monitoring independent
expenditures and contributions to entities making such expenditures
to prevent more broadly defined corruption.

99 See S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 53 (1969) (concluding that the underlying rationale in
modifying the law is that publicly disclosing the identity of substantial contributors might
prevent some gifts); JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 81 (same).
100 See H.R. REP. NO. 91–413, pt. 1, at 36 (1969) (stating that disclosure of information
relating to substantial contributors, directors, trustees, other management officials, and highly
compensated employees “is intended to facilitate meaningful enforcement of the limitations
imposed by the bill, especially when combined with the publicity provisions”).
101 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (noting that state interests for disclosure
requirements include “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and
avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive
electioneering restriction”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976); Robert F. Bauer, Not
Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System, 6
ELECTION L.J. 38, 38 (2007); Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 237, 239 (2004); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 270
(2000).
102 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909–10 (2010).
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Citizens United also virtually eliminated the second interest
because no limits now apply on expenditures made independently of
candidates and political parties or contributions to entities making
such expenditures (with the possible exception of foreign individuals
or entities). 103 It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that the Court in
Citizens United relied solely on the third interest—informing
voters. 104 But that single interest still left the pro-disclosure baseline
intact. 105
Working from the historic baseline of disclosure to the FEC, a
cost-benefit approach appears to usually be controlling and generally
favors public disclosure of the financial support provided by
identified individuals and entities to candidates, political parties,
political committees, and independent expenditures.106 This may be in
large part because the constitutionality of disclosure provisions is
determined using the cost-benefit approach. More specifically, the
current disclosure regime was unanimously upheld in Buckley v.
Valeo based on the reasoning that the benefits of disclosure in the
form of deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption,
facilitating enforcement of other election laws, and informing voters
generally outweighed any negative consequences of such
disclosure. 107 More recently, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court
by an eight-to-one vote upheld disclosure rules applicable to various
forms of election-related spending engaged in independently of
candidates and political parties based solely on the voter information
benefits, rejecting as a general matter the arguments that the potential
harm—including any chilling effect on speech—from disclosure
outweighed those benefits. 108 Only Justice Thomas dissented, but he
did not take a different approach than the majority. Rather, he differed
with his colleagues because he viewed the likely harm from
disclosure as substantially greater than they did.109
The Court has also recognized that in particular circumstances
where the costs of disclosure outweigh the benefits, an exception to
the generally applicable disclosure rules exists as a constitutional
matter. 110 For example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
103 Id.
104 Id.

at 913.
at 914.

105 Id.
106 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 862 (detailing how recent Supreme Court
cases in this area “represent an almost complete disregard for individual privacy interests”).
107 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 81–82 (1976).
108 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–16.
109 Id. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71 (“There could well be a case . . . where the threat to the
exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so
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Committee, the Court found that given the extensive evidence of
retaliatory actions taken against members and financial supporters of
a socialist political party when their identities became known, the cost
of disclosure to those individuals outweighed the benefits to the
public, and so the Constitution required an exemption from the
normally applicable disclosure rules.111 The same political party
recently successfully petitioned the FEC for an extension of that
exception, but only after producing extensive evidence of continuing
retaliatory action against its members and financial supporters when
their identities became publicly known. 112
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have proven less
sympathetic to such claims when the retaliatory action is less
prevalent or traceable to the public disclosure. For example,
reviewing same-sex marriage cases, the courts have generally rejected
attempts to keep the identities of supporters of ballot initiatives
opposing same-sex marriage private even given evidence of scattered
acts of retaliation ranging from boycotts and job terminations to
criminal acts. 113 Again, these decisions appear to have been driven by
a cost-benefit analysis, with costs found wanting. 114

insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.”). For examples
outside of the election law context, see, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539, 554–56 (1963) (holding that a legislative inquiry regarding possible members
with Communist affiliations was not constitutional when no relationship is demonstrated
between association and subversive or Communist activities); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
US. 516, 523–24 (1960) (holding that the compelled disclosure to the government and public of
the NAACP’s members was not constitutional when there exists “uncontroverted evidence” that
members would then likely face “harassment and threats of bodily harm”); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (same for members of local NAACP chapters).
111 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982).
112 See FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, ADVISORY OPINION 2009–01, at 5–9 (2009),
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (reviewing the facts presented by the Socialist
Workers Party).
113 See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010) (holding that disclosure of
referendum petitions does not generally violate the First Amendment and remanding for
consideration of whether disclosure of a petitions relating to a specific referendum would); Nat’l
Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 765 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47–48 (D. Me. 2011) (holding that required
registration and reporting by ballot initiative committee did not violate the First Amendment);
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (concluding that,
in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, the claim that disclosure of donors to
ballot committees would violate the First Amendment was almost certain to fail).
114 See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819–21 (balancing the state’s interest in “preserving the
integrity of the electoral process,” supported by evidence of past referendum petition-related
fraud, against the lack of evidence that, in general, public identification of petition signers
results in harassment and intimidation); Nat’l Org. for Marriage, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 53, 53 n.85
(balancing the state’s interest in informing voters against the lack of any evidence of likely
harassment); ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1207–11, 1216–19 (balancing the state’s
interest in informing voters, which would be seriously burdened if disclosure was not permitted,
against the likelihood of threats, harassment, and reprisals resulting from disclosure, which was
very low).
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The one significant exception is found in the McIntyre case, where
the Court concluded that an individual who personally created flyers
relating to a local election issue (but not a candidate) could not be
compelled to identify herself on the flyers. 115 Though the Court cited
to the long history of anonymous political involvement in our
country, 116 it still relied in large part on a cost-benefit analysis. The
Court ultimately concluded that since the election related to an issue,
not a candidate, preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption was not at stake, and given the fact that revealing the
relatively obscure individual’s identity would not help voters interpret
the flyer’s message, any benefits from disclosure were minimal. 117
Mrs. McIntyre’s case was also probably aided by the fact that the
complaint about her lack of disclosure appeared likely to have been
made in retaliation for her political position.118
B. A Right to Privacy
1. In Theory
The concept of privacy as a fundamental right is traceable to the
view that a basic right of all individuals is a right to autonomy. 119
This view asserts that for individuals to fully be human they must be
free to make choices.120 Anything that limits choices, therefore,
threatens this basic aspect of what it means to be human.
A right to privacy is necessary for autonomy because when
otherwise private information regarding an individual’s choices is
115 McIntyre

v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
at 343, 343 n.6.
117 Id. at 348–49, 356.
118 See id. at 338 (noting that the official who reported her supported the opposite position).
119 See, e.g., DELANY & CAROLAN, supra note 699, at 16–20 (exploring how privacy
enhances autonomy); RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 116 (same with respect to informational
privacy); Geoffrey Gomery, Whose Autonomy Matters? Reconciling the Competing Claims of
Privacy and Freedom of Expression, 27 LEGAL STUD. 404, 408–09 (2007) (same); Kahn, supra
note 7171, at 378 (explaining how “privacy is an attribute of individuality”); id. at 384–86
(summarizing the relationship between privacy and autonomy); Lindsay, supra note 699, at 148
(proposing that the moral autonomy of individuals is the basis for the deontological approach to
privacy). A right to privacy may also be based on other more fundamental concepts, such as
dignity, but in this context the autonomy basis is the most applicable. See SOLOVE, supra note
699, at 85–87 (describing nonconsequentialist grounds for a right to privacy, including but not
limited to autonomy).
120 See, e.g., RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 50 (“Only a life lived autonomously . . . can also
be a rewarding life.”). An extension of this view is that privacy deserves protection not so much
because autonomy benefits the individual but because individual autonomy ultimately benefits
society. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND SECURITY 50 (2011) (“A society without privacy protection would be oppressive. When
protecting individual rights, we as a society decide to hold back in order to receive the benefits
of creating free zones for individuals to flourish.”).
116 Id.
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expected to be revealed to others, an individual may alter his or her
choices to conform to the views of others regarding the choices that
are best. 121 If this occurs, the disclosure of that individual’s otherwise
private information reduces that individual’s autonomy. Infringement
of privacy therefore requires a compelling justification, since such
infringement negatively impacts a basis aspect of being human.
There are two important refinements to this approach. First, while
this approach supports a stronger legal right to privacy it does not
mean that the Constitution contains such a right in all contexts. While
the Supreme Court has identified a right to privacy in the
Constitution, that right is a limited one. 122 This constitutional right
does not, importantly for our purpose here, reach the required
disclosure of financial information in connection with the federal tax
or election laws. Instead, the Court considers such disclosure under
the exacting scrutiny analysis discussed above. 123
Second, because this right to privacy flows from an individual’s
need for autonomy, it is a right of individuals and not of other
entities. 124 Artificial persons such as nonprofit corporations only
enjoy the protection granted by this right to the extent necessary to
facilitate protection of individual privacy. In other words, any privacy
right of such artificial persons is derivative of the privacy right of
individuals.
2. In Practice
This autonomy of the individual right to privacy plays a significant
role in the disclosure rules found in the three legal regimes detailed
above. In the federal tax regime generally, acknowledgement of that
right leads to a strong bias against public disclosure of taxpayer
information. 125 Indeed, the bias is so strong it has been extended to
121 See RÖSSLER, supra note 70, at 73 (“To be able to develop authentic plans, to design or
define oneself through one’s dealings . . ., one’s expectations with respect to other people’s
knowledge about oneself must not be mistaken.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent people from engaging
in activities that further their own self-development.”).
122 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (sexual practices between
consenting adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (birth control). There also is a version of the right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–
68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (involving the use of GPS tracking by law enforcement authorities), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
123 See supra notes 6060–622, 1077–1099 and accompanying text (discussing the exacting
scrutiny standard).
124 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 881–82 (noting that “privacy theory
focuses on individuals, not collectives”).
125 See S. REP. NO. 94–938, at 317 (1976) (asking whether disclosure of federal tax
information, even to other government agencies, “breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy
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artificial entities such as for-profit corporations, as well as protecting
the privacy of the individuals who are the vast majority of
taxpayers. 126 A recent proposal suggests, however, that there should
be limited disclosure of tax information relating to corporations in
part to improve tax compliance.127 While not framed in these terms, a
relaxation of the anti-disclosure rules for artificial entities is also
consistent with this conceptualization of a right to privacy when
doing so does not reveal individual financial information. Such
relaxation would be less consistent with this right-to-privacy
approach, however, if it extended to situations when entity-level
disclosure would be more likely to reveal individual financial
information, as would often be the case with closely held corporations
and other entities owned by a small group of individuals, which
would presumably include many if not most partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The disclosure rules for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations also
reveal the influence of this right-to-privacy approach in two important
ways, even given the general pro-disclosure position of those rules.
First, and as detailed previously, the existence of such a right is
acknowledged but is deemed to be outweighed—or perhaps waived—
by the receipt of tax benefits by such organizations and the resulting
need for the public to be assured that such benefits are in fact
deserved. 128 Although not generally justified in this way, disclosure is
also consistent with the right being primarily a right for individuals,
not artificial legal entities, since disclosure of financial and activity

on the part of the American citizen with respect to such information”); id. at 318 (citing the
“citizen’s right to privacy” with respect to federal tax information). But see Linder, supra note
822, at 970, 973–74 (arguing that financial information is inherently public and has little to do
with individual autonomy, so no right to privacy should attach to such information). The right to
privacy does not, however, prevent the IRS from gathering taxpayer financial information for its
own use. Bittker, supra note 15, at 489 (citation omitted) (“[T]he power of the IRS to get
information about taxpayers . . . is extremely sweeping and . . . the right of privacy plays
virtually no role in this information-gathering process.”).
126 When the focus is on public disclosure of information relating to entities as opposed to
individuals, however, a right to privacy is usually not considered but instead only the costbenefit concerns relating to the effect of such disclosure on tax compliance. See, e.g., Blank,
supra note 855, at 590 (discussing potential costs and benefits of “shaming sanctions” to address
corporate tax abuse); see also Bittker, supra note 15, at 480 (“To present the conflict between
disclosure and privacy in its sharpest form, I will limit myself to the disclosure of individual
income tax returns; since corporate returns contain fewer personal details, disclosure would be
less dramatic.”).
127 Lenter, Shackelford, & Slemrod, supra note 17, at 827; see also Strauss, supra note
822, at 31 (considering a similar proposal relating to state business tax information).
128 See supra notes 522, 955–966 and accompanying text (discussing why the baseline for
nonprofit organizations is pro-disclosure).
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information for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations generally does not
reveal financial information for identified individuals.
Second, it is also consistent with a right-to-privacy approach that
at least some of the areas where nonprofit organizations are not
required to publicly disclose information involve information about
individuals—e.g., information about donors and individual
grantees. 129 At the same time, the disclosure of information about
private foundation donors and director, officer, and key employee
compensation is also consistent with this approach as it is justified by
the strong interest in the public being assured that individuals with a
high level of influence over tax-exempt nonprofit organizations do
not use that influence to improperly enrich themselves. 130
The right to privacy as described above plays a relatively minimal
role in the election law context. But it has not completely escaped
notice. 131 Even here, however, the election laws are arguably
consistent with this approach in two ways. First, the information
disclosed about individuals involved in the political process is
relatively limited—the amount and recipients of their contributions,
plus the names, addresses, and employers of the contributors—as
compared to the much more comprehensive financial information
provided by taxpayers to the government. 132 A reasonable argument
can therefore be made that the infringement on the financial privacy
of such individuals is relatively limited.
Second, because the individual financial information disclosed is
so limited, the primary effect of the existing election law disclosure
rules is to reveal, publicly, the political leanings of the individual
contributors. Indeed, it is this effect of such disclosures that is most
commonly cited as infringing on the right to privacy of individuals. 133
There are, however, at least two arguments against the right to
privacy either attaching to information about political leanings or
controlling whether such information remains private. The first
129 See JCT REPORT vol. II, supra note 28, at 81 (“[D]onors have legitimate privacy
concerns.”); supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing individual grantees).
130 See supra notes 397–411, 100 and accompanying text (discussing private foundations
and officers)100.
131 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 860 (“[S]erious attention to political
privacy remains relatively invisible compared to areas such as health care or social media”);
supra note 688 and accompanying text (citing commentators that have argued that the balancing
approach, which is currently used in the election law context, is inconsistent with the right-toprivacy approach).
132 Compare supra note 15 and accompanying text (federal tax law filings), with supra
note 565 and accompanying text (election law filings).
133 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 866 (noting but criticizing the focus on
retaliation and chilling effects while ignoring other negative effects of disclosure in this
context).
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argument is that one of the natural consequences of having and acting
on political leanings is having to defend such political leanings
publicly. 134 That is, politics is an inherently public activity because it
is generally conducted publicly and affects the broader public. Thus,
an individual who seeks to influence politics in a direction that they
desire has no legitimate expectation of privacy. Any exceptions to this
general view, such as those that currently exist with respect to voting,
should therefore be limited to situations where the costs of public
disclosure clearly exceed the benefits to society.
The second, related argument is that an individual’s political
views, if acted on, potentially affect matters that will primarily impact
others, including possibly the entire public. Given this potential
effect, it is the public’s business to know about an individual’s
political actions even if that individual’s political views would
otherwise be private. In other words, the public has a right to know
about such actions, even if they reveal otherwise private political
leanings. The public’s right to know trumps the contributor’s right to
privacy similarly to the way that the public’s interest in knowing
whether nonprofit organizations that receive significant tax benefits
qualify for those benefits trumps any right to privacy (derivative or
otherwise) such organizations might enjoy. Again, exceptions should
only exist for particular situations where the costs of disclosure
clearly outweigh the benefits.
There is, however, a reasonable counterargument. The
counterargument is that since the right to privacy for individuals has
its roots in the fundamental human characteristic of autonomy,
including autonomy with respect to political choices, it would be
inconsistent with that origin to expose such choices to public scrutiny
and therefore influence. That is, if an individual’s political action is
not inherently public—as would be the case with, for example,
making an endorsement or having a yard sign—such action should be
protected by a right to privacy because otherwise there is significant
risk that the individual’s autonomy will be comprised. 135 This line of
134 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09–
559) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he fact is that running a democracy takes a certain amount of civic
courage. And the First Amendment does not protect you from criticism or even nasty phone
calls when you exercise your political rights to legislate, or to take part in the legislative
process.”); McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 867 (“[I]n the election disclosure cases,
calls for ‘civic courage,’ characterizations of political activity as ‘lawmaking,’ and references to
the ‘public sphere’ all endeavor to define conflict away, simply by placing involvement with
elections on the ‘public’ side of a clear and dispositive line.”).
135 See McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 872 (“[D]onations, petition signatures, and
party registration generally are not intended as announcements of political views to one’s
neighbors.”); id. at 877 (“The prospect of disclosure can discourage individuals from taking
certain political actions, and it pushes citizens toward conformity with dominant views.”).
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reasoning suggests that not all political actions are inherently public
and so the right to privacy applies to at least some political actions.
And even though private political actions have public effect, that
alone should not be sufficient to overcome the right to privacy. Part
III considers these arguments further in the specific context of
individuals financially supporting politically active, tax-exempt
organizations.
Vindicating privacy concerns therefore can be pursued in two
strikingly different ways. The different approaches to privacy and
disclosure in the general tax, nonprofit tax, and election law contexts
reveals that the approach chosen can lead to a large variation in
results. The choice made in each context may make sense in that
context. But when the contexts intersect—as is the case when
discussing expanding disclosure with respect to politically active, taxexempt nonprofits—a choice about which and to what extent each
approach will be applied to determine the appropriate level of
disclosure and privacy is required. To the proposals for such
expanded disclosure and these choices we now turn.
III. NONPROFITS, POLITICS, AND PRIVACY
The increased attention to and amount of political spending by taxexempt nonprofits in the wake of Citizens United has generated a
plethora of proposals for increasing the public disclosure of
information about both these entities and their financial supporters.
This Part briefly summarizes these proposals and then considers them
from first a cost-benefit perspective and then a right-to-privacy
perspective. Perhaps not surprisingly, the cost-benefit perspective
generally supports such proposals with only the caveat that in some,
relatively unusual situations, an exception might be required. The
application of the right-to-privacy perspective is, however, more
complicated. Because that right primarily applies to individuals, it
does not create a barrier to public disclosure of information relating to
the entities themselves. But with respect to information relating to
financial supporters, many if not most of whom may be individuals or
entities closely associated with specific individuals, the right does
provide a ground for objecting to such public disclosure. That
objection is only valid, however, if the right applies not only to
financial information but also to political leanings that otherwise
would not be publicly known.
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A. Proposals
While commentators and lawmakers have floated many proposals
to increase public disclosure of information relating to politically
active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, these proposals can be
grouped into essentially two categories. 136 The first category is
information relating to such organizations themselves, including their
finances and activities. Examples of such proposals include requiring
such entities to apply to the IRS for recognition of their tax-exempt
status, requiring more detailed, and quicker, reporting of political
expenditures and activities than currently exists through the generally
required annual information return, and requiring such entities to
report on their political activities to their members or donors.137
The second category is information identifying significant
financial supporters of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations.138 While
tax-exempt nonprofits are already required to report identifying
information for relatively large donors to the IRS as part of the annual
information return, such information is not disclosed to the public,
except if the donations are to a private foundation or a political
organization. 139 Current proposals would generally require that for
other types of tax-exempt nonprofits engaged in political activity such
information would both be made public and be submitted much more

136 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing proposals by Congress and
commentators).
137 See, e.g., House DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, at § 301 (disclosure of certain political
activities to members and donors); Senate DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, at § 301 (same);
Aprill, supra note 4, at 401–02 (proposing requiring an application for exemption within a
specified period of time); Tobin, supra note 4, at 439–40 (same).
138 See, e.g., House DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, § 211 (disclosure of identifying
information regarding donors to organizations engaged in certain political activities); Senate
DISCLOSE Act, supra note 4, § 211 (proposing similar requirements); Aprill, supra note 4, at
403–404 (disclosure of contributors to noncharitable, tax-exempt organizations); Tobin, supra
note 4, at 440–44 (disclosure of contributors in excess of $25,000 annually); Torres-Spelliscy,
supra note 4, at 90–91 (discussing the secretive trade association problem and proposing more
disclosure); Callahan, supra note 4, at A21 (proposing that the IRS create a new category of
nonprofits engaged in political activity in which entities would be forced to disclose all their
donors). A related aspect of such proposals is required public disclosure of the recipients of
substantial political expenditures by such organizations. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 4, at 404–
05 (proposing to tax political activity of nonprofit, noncharitable organizations regardless of
whether the organizations has net investment income); Tobin, supra note 4, at 440–44
(disclosure of non-employee expenditures in excess of $25,000). Such recipients tend to be
entities as opposed to individuals and are not generally supporting such organizations
financially, but only exchanging goods or services for fair market value payments, so disclosure
of their role does not necessarily reveal their political leanings. For these reasons, such
disclosure does not raise significant issues under either a cost-benefit approach or a right to
privacy approach and is ignored for purposes of this article.
139 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing which organizations must
disclose their major donors to the public).
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quickly. And some proposals would also expand the universe of
donors subject to disclosure.
Whether such proposals are desirable depends in significant part
on the approach one takes with respect to privacy. This Part therefore
considers these categories of proposals using each of the two
approaches discussed above.
B.

The Cost-Benefit Approach
1. Entity Disclosure

As discussed above, the existing rules requiring public disclosure
of applications for recognition of exemption and annual information
returns filed by tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are justified for
two reasons: (1) the public’s interest in knowing whether such
organizations qualify for these benefits; and (2) the consent of taxexempt organizations to disclosure as a condition for receiving tax
benefits. 140 Thus, additional or quicker disclosure of information
relating to the subset of organizations that engage in political
activities should only be rejected under the cost-benefit approach if
the costs of disclosure generally outweigh the benefits. Most political
activity by a tax-exempt nonprofit organization is a public matter in
itself—advertisements, mailings, phone banks, and so on. And
financial information relating to tax-exempt nonprofit organizations is
also already public given the pro-disclosure baseline. Thus, there does
not appear to be generally any significant costs of such additional and
faster disclosure.
Furthermore, additional and faster disclosure provides the benefit
of enabling the public to better ascertain in a timely fashion whether a
given organization in fact qualifies for the tax-exempt status they are
claiming. 141 Specifically, non-charitable tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations that are not Internal Revenue Code section 527 political
organizations may only engage in political activity as a secondary
activity. Yet there have allegedly been repeated attempts to violate
this rule in recent years.142 Thus, a clear need exists for the public to
140 See supra notes 522, 955–966 and accompanying text (discussing why the baseline for
nonprofit organizations is pro-disclosure).
141 See Tobin, supra note 4, at 439–40 (discussing the problems with the current
application regime).
142 See Nicholas Confessore, Watchdogs Call Out 4 Nonprofits as Too Political for Tax
Exemption,
THE
CAUCUS
(Sept.
28,
2011,
5:26
PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/watchdogs-call-out-4-nonprofits-as-toopolitical-for-tax-exemption/ (discussing how several watchdog groups argue for tighter
campaign laws that would take away tax exemptions for nonprofit groups that become too
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have a faster way to ensure this rule is satisfied. Finally, it should be
noted that while certain charitable nonprofits—primarily churches
and church-related entities—are exempt from the existing filing and
disclosure rules, those nonprofits would not be affected by these
proposals since they are prohibited under current federal tax law from
engaging in any activities that would support or oppose a candidate
for elected public office.143
Thus, under a cost-benefit approach, it appears that there are no
plausible general objections to proposals that would require additional
and faster disclosure of financial and political activity information for
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. If such
disclosure would be problematic for a particular entity under this
approach an exception could be considered to cover such situations.
But especially given the public nature of most political activity, it is
difficult to imagine a scenario where an exception would be needed.
2. Donor Disclosure
Currently, information regarding financial supporters of taxexempt nonprofit organizations is not subject to disclosure except
with respect to private foundations and political organizations.144 The
private foundation exception arises out of the combination of the
control of private foundations by a single donor or small group of
donors and deductibility of contributions that donors to private
foundations, as section 501(c)(3) organizations, enjoy—a
combination that does not exist and so is not relevant for non501(c)(3)s that are permitted to engage in political activity, albeit as
less than a primary activity, but whose donors do not enjoy
deductibility for their contributions.145 The reasons for the section 527
exception are the same reasons as for the current proposals to expand
this exception to encompass donors to other types of politically active
tax-exempt nonprofit organizations and is considered below.

engaged in politics); Matthew Murray, IRS Scrutinizing Political Activity, ROLL CALL, Apr. 14,
2008 (describing how the IRS is reportedly closely examining recent allegations of excessive
political activity by section 501(c)(4), tax-exempt social welfare organizations).
143 I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3) (2006). While “political activity” could be construed as
including activity relating to ballot initiatives and referenda as well as candidates, the proposals
have generally focused on candidate-related political activity.
144 See supra note 37–41 and accompanying text (discussing private foundations and
political organizations and the reasoning behind the different treatment in the Internal Revenue
Code).
145 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the reasoning behind the private
foundation exceptions).
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In general, public disclosure of donor information is disfavored
under a cost-benefit approach. While there is a baseline of complete
public disclosure, the benefit from an exception for donors in the
form of significantly increased donations is generally seen as
substantially outweighing the cost, if any, to ensuring compliance
with the requirements for being tax-exempt that the lack of such
disclosure would generate (except in the case of private
foundations). 146 The key question, for both the proposals at issue here
and the existing political organization donor disclosure rules, is
therefore whether the calculus is different when the recipient
organization is engaged in political activities.
The benefits of donor disclosure commonly cited are some of the
same ones that support donor disclosure under election law. They
include increased voter information and preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption.147 For reasons I have developed elsewhere,
such interests are generally only served when the amount of
contributions by the publicly identified donor are relatively large. 148
For such significant donors, however, there is a plausible argument
that knowing who financially supports a particular, politically active
organization helps targets of that organization’s political
communications interpret those communications and deters improper
influence (and the appearance of improper influence) of public
officials even if, as the Supreme Court held in Citizens United, such
influence does not rise to a quid pro quo level.
At the same time, the costs of such disclosures to the donors are
usually relatively minimal. The financial information disclosed
provides only a very partial picture of a donor’s financial situation,
unlike the much more comprehensive financial information provided
on taxpayer’s federal income tax return. As for disclosing the donor’s
political leanings, even if those leanings were not previously known
to the public, there is scant evidence of negative repercussions from
146 See

supra note 999 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits donor anonymity

creates).
147 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing election law). The other oftcited benefit of ensuring increased compliance with other laws is not a factor here. That is
because tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations that are not Internal Revenue Code section 527
political organizations generally only make expenditures independently of candidates and
political parties, and under Citizens United and a subsequent FEC ruling applying that decision
there are no longer limits on the sources or amounts of financial support for such expenditures
(with the possible exception of few limited categories of sources). See Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (striking down limits on independent expenditures); FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION,
ADVISORY
OPINION
2010–11,
at
2
(2010),
available
at
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao (finding that “soliciting and accepting unlimited
contributions from individuals, political committees, corporations, and labor organizations for
the purpose of making independent expenditures” was legal).
148 Mayer, supra note 633, at 281–82.
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the leanings becoming publicly known except in relative rare
circumstances. 149 Such rare circumstances can be accommodated by
building in an exception mechanism similar to the one available in the
election law context for the supporters of groups such as the Socialist
Workers Party. 150
There are also potential costs to the organization involved in the
form of reduced contributions because some donors will shy away
from having their contributions—and thus their political leanings—
revealed publicly. That is a legitimate concern, but the extent to
which donors will in fact change their behavior has not been
demonstrated in other contexts—such as opposition to same-sex
marriage—that have proven to be particularly controversial. 151 Thus,
the benefits already discussed appear to outweigh what at this point
are relatively speculative costs.
A cost-benefit approach therefore does not raise any general
barriers to public disclosure of information regarding donors to
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, at least if the
donors are relatively large financial contributors. Indeed, in apparent
recognition of the fact that disclosure is generally only beneficial if
the donors involved have contributed substantial sums, most
commentators who have put forward such proposals are willing to
limit their reach to donors who give at or even above the already
relatively high trigger amounts for currently required disclosure to the
IRS. 152 Subject to this caveat and the need for an exception
mechanism in the rare case of demonstrated significant harassment of
donors to certain types of groups or causes, the cost-benefit approach
supports all of the existing disclosure proposals.

149 See supra note 11313 and accompanying text (citing cases dealing with disclosure of
political leanings that found the evidence of harassment insufficient to justify an exception). But
see McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 871–79 (discussing additional costs of disclosure).
What McGeveran lists as additional costs of disclosure I would instead identify as reasons for
supporting the use of the right-to-privacy approach, which, for the reasons I have discussed, is
conceptually and practically distinct from the cost-benefit approach. See supra note 733 and
accompanying text (noting this distinction).
150 See supra note 644 and accompanying text (discussing the Socialist Workers Party
situation).
151 See Mayer, supra note 633, at 277–78 (discussing the same-sex marriage evidence).
152 Compare, e.g., Tobin, supra note 4, at 440 n.79 (setting a threshold over $25,000, but
expressing a willingness to consider an even higher threshold), with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
FORM 990 SCHEDULE B SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf (requiring, as a general rule, disclosure to the IRS of
identifying information for donors who contribute $5,000 or more annually).
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C. The Right-to-Privacy Approach
1. Entity Disclosure
With respect to increased disclosure by entities of their own
finances and activities, the right-to-privacy approach does not require
rejection of the proposals for two reasons. First, the right to privacy is
a right of individuals, not entities.153 Second, unlike a family business
or a family foundation (for which disclosure of donors is already
required for other reasons under any conditions), disclosure of
information about politically active, tax-exempt nonprofits does not
represent an indirect infringement on the privacy of individuals who
financially support such organizations. Even if an organization is
supported by a single individual or small group of individuals, neither
the organization nor those individuals need to disclose that connection
publicly. That in fact is one of the grounds cited for requiring
disclosure of donor information, which I address in a moment—it is
relatively easy for donors to maintain their anonymity in this context
absent government compelled disclosure of their identities.154
2. Donor Disclosure
The situation is less clear, however, when it comes to disclosure of
information about donors to politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations. Many, perhaps most, donors are individuals who under
this approach have a fundamental right to privacy. If that right to
privacy extends to the information at issue here, then there has to be a
relatively strong justification for setting that right aside in whole or in
part.
As discussed previously, publicly disclosing the identities of
financial supporters reveals two pieces of information. First, it reveals
information about the supporters’ financial situations, but only in a
very partial way—again, much less comprehensive financial
information than what is found, for example, on an individual’s
federal income tax return. Second, it reveals information about the
political leanings of those supporters.
If the fundamental right to privacy applies to otherwise private
financial information but does not extend to otherwise private
political actions, there is a strong argument that it should not apply in
153 See supra note 1244 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of the right to
privacy).
154 See supra note 2 (citing sources that discuss the propensity of tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations to keep their donors secret).
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this context, or at least not apply very strongly, because of the very
limited amount of financial information that is disclosed. Such a lack
of application or weak application of the right to privacy would
suggest that the cost-benefit analysis conducted above should be
controlling, so proposals to increase disclosure of donor information
should not be barred by this right. That is, the cost associated with
revealing this otherwise private financial information should simply
be included in the cost-benefit analysis. And for most donors that cost
will be minimal or non-existent since the public can gain information
about their general financial situations through other channels such as
the neighborhood in which they live, the house they own, the type of
car they drive, the job they have, and so on.
If, however, the fundamental right to privacy extends to
information about otherwise private political actions, then disclosure
of contributions is much more problematic. But there are at least two
arguments against such an extension. First, the inherent public nature
of politics suggests that no right to privacy should attach to any
political actions. And second, the potential public effect of all
political actions suggests that even if a right to privacy attaches to
some political actions, the public’s right to know about actions that
could affect it generally outweighs the private political actor’s right to
privacy. At the same time, however, it could be reasonably argued
that because public disclosure of otherwise private political actions
may cause individuals to change their choices regarding political
actions and thus lose a portion of their autonomy, the right to privacy
should extend to such actions. 155
Resolving this debate generally is well beyond the scope of this
Article. But, below, I attempt to at least to resolve it as it applies to
the specific context of proposals to disclose information about the
individual financial supporters of politically active, tax-exempt
organizations. In this context, it is plausible to conclude that publicly
revealing the identities of financial supporters for politically
controversial tax-exempt organizations, such as National Right to
Life, the Planned Parenthood Action Council, the Human Rights
Campaign, or the National Organization for Marriage, will cause
some individuals to shy away from providing financial support that
they would otherwise be willing to contribute. Indeed, such financial
support seems similar to voting, which is intentionally kept private in
order to preserve the ability of individual voters to vote without undue

155 See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (discussing the integral relationship
between individual autonomy and the right to privacy).
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influence from others. 156 Thus, despite the public nature of politics, to
say that the right to privacy simply does not attach at all to political
actions that the actor could keep private absent government
compelled disclosure appears to go too far. 157 Furthermore, because
donations to politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations
generally do not result in a tax benefit for the donor, it cannot be
argued credibly that the donor has consented to disclosure in
exchange for receiving a tax benefit.158
That conclusion, however, only addresses the first argument
against extending the right to privacy to financial support of
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. There is still
the issue of whether the right to privacy in this context should
generally be overcome by the public’s interest in the information
because of the potential public effect of the financial support. It is
important to emphasize that this comparison is not the same as the
cost-benefit analysis conducted previously, where the demonstrable
benefits to the public are balanced against the demonstrable costs to
the individuals involved. Rather, under a right-to-privacy approach, it
is assumed that the individuals involved have a right to privacy that
can only be overcome by a similarly weighty right that would be
sufficiently vindicated by public disclosure.
There is undoubtedly a right in a liberal democratic framework for
the public to know about actions that affect or are likely to affect the
operation of government. 159 Numerous government transparency laws
are based on this right, including laws that reveal information not
156 See generally Allison R. Hayward, Bentham & Ballots: Tradeoffs Between Secrecy and
Accountability in How We Vote, 26 J.L. & POL. 39, 45–55 (2010) (discussing the debates in
England and the United States surrounding the eventual adoption of the secret ballot).
157 See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY B ILL
RTS. J. 927, 956 (2011) (considering whether anonymity in politics induces citizens to come
closer to consensus norms of ideal democratic behavior and concluding that this determination
is “highly variable and context-dependent”); McGeveran, Persona, supra note 688, at 872
(arguing that since the flow of information to the public is unintended in many activities that
have political connotations, such as giving a donation to an organization, signing petitions, or
registering for a political party, such acts are not inherently public).
158 While donors to charitable organizations may receive a tax benefit in the form of a
charitable contribution deduction, such organizations are prohibited from supporting or
opposing candidates. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2006) (defining a “corporation, trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation” to which a donor can donate and take a charitable
contribution deduction to exclude any organization that “attempt[s] to . . . participate in, or
intervene in . . ., any political campaign on behalf of (or in position to) any candidate for public
office”).
159 See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765)
reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 13 (George W. Carey ed., 2000)
(“[T]he people . . . have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that
most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their
rulers.”).
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only about government actors but also about those who interact with
government actors in a way that might influence their actions, such as
lobbyists, contractors, and, of course, campaign contributors.160 Thus,
the key question is not whether such a right exists. Rather, it is
whether the public’s right to know is sufficiently vindicated by public
disclosure of information about the individual financial supporters of
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations to overcome the
donors’ right to privacy.
Whether the public’s right to know is vindicated by disclosure
does not depend on whether the knowledge revealed will be used by
the public—an issue that is considered under the cost-benefit
approach—because that is the public’s choice. Instead, the question
depends on whether the knowledge revealed actually relates to actions
that influence or are likely to influence ultimate government action.
Additionally, the scale of the knowledge revealed should at least
roughly match the scale at which such influence is likely to occur.
Compare, for example, a single individual’s action, which is highly
unlikely to actually influence government action, and a large group of
individual’s action, which is likely to have such influence. The
public’s right to know is vindicated by public disclosure of
information relating to the group. But public disclosure of
information relating to the single, by themselves inconsequential,
individual, does not vindicate any right to know because it will not
influence the government in any way.
Most financial supporters of politically active, tax-exempt
nonprofit organizations provide only modest support both in absolute
terms and relative to the overall finances of the supported
organization. Thus, the right-to-privacy approach suggests that the
public disclosure of individual information about most financial
supporters will not sufficiently vindicate the public’s right to know so
as to justify overriding the supporters’ right to privacy. Of course if
they support the organization in other, more influential ways—such
as serving on the organization’s board of directors or as an officer of
the organization—then the public’s right to know would appear to
trump the right to privacy of those individuals, but such information
is generally already publicly disclosed. 161 With respect to supporters
160 See FUNG ET AL., supra note 788, at xii (describing “[r]ight-to-know” laws that apply to
governments as a “cornerstone of democratic governance”); David A. Anderson, The Failure of
American Privacy Law, in PROTECTING PRIVACY 139, 140 (Basil S. Markesinis, ed. 1999) (“We
expect government to conduct its business publicly, even if that infringes the privacy of those
caught up in the matter.”).
161 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990, at Part VII (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (providing a section for an organization to list its
current officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and highest compensated employees).
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who provide only financial support, however, the public’s right to
know would only be vindicated when those supporters provide a
substantial amount of support in either absolute or relative terms such
that the organization’s influence—which is what presumably then
may influence government action that affects the public—to a
significant extent reflects the supporter’s influence.
The right-to-privacy approach leads to a similar place as the costbenefit approach, but arguably for more compelling reasons. Public
disclosure of information about individual financial supporters of
politically active, tax-exempt organizations is only justified when the
financial support provided by a given individual (or perhaps group of
closely related individuals) is substantial enough that it effectively
gives that individual the ability to influence government actions
through the operation of the recipient organization. An example of
such a situation would be when a single wealthy individual funds an
organization. But other, less extreme examples could exist. For
example, the government could set a threshold dollar amount or a
threshold percentage of the recipient organization’s annual revenues
that the contribution would have to exceed. The selection of these
thresholds would necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. But the selection
of both should recognize that the public’s right to know depends on
the actual likelihood of influence over government action. And to
adequately protect financial supporters’ right to privacy, the dollar
threshold should be significantly higher than the current disclosure to
the IRS threshold of $5,000. 162 While almost certainly not based on
this reasoning, at least some commentators who have proposed
disclosure rules have put forward higher thresholds that are consistent
with this approach. 163 Furthermore, because the right to privacy is
primarily an individual right and only derivatively of entities, a lower
threshold could be adopted for entities that make donations to
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofits. 164
That if the cost-benefit approach relied on almost exclusively in
the election law context is applied to the current proposals for
disclosure of information relating to politically tax-exempt nonprofit
162 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 SCHEDULE B SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf.
163 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 4, at 440 n.79 (proposing a threshold of $25,000 and noting
that there is a possibility that the amount should be set even higher); see also Justin Levitt,
Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 227 (2010)
(proposing a “‘Democracy Facts’ disclaimer” on political communications that would list the
five largest contributors to the group paying for the communication).
164 This would also be desirable from an enforcement perspective. Otherwise multiple
entities could be used as conduits by a single individual donor to avoid reaching the disclosure
threshold.
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organizations, such proposals fair relatively well is not coincidental.
After all, that approach has tended to support the existing election law
disclosure rules even among otherwise skeptics of campaign finance
laws. If, however, the right-to-privacy approach used in the general
tax context is extended to this context, the results become somewhat
more muddied. While the latter approach does not undermine
proposals for disclosure of the finances and activities of the
organizations themselves, it at least raises questions about proposals
that would reveal the political leanings of individual financial
supporters of those organizations. If the right to privacy extends to
those political leanings—granted, a debatable point—then a more
compelling case for disclosure is required. A case can be made by
invoking the public’s right to know about individual actions that are
likely to influence government actions that affect the public. But even
then the case is only valid when the disclosure is limited to individual
financial supporters whose level of support in either absolute or
relative terms is likely to permit them to influence the supported
organization and, as a consequence, the government’s actions.
CONCLUSION
Favoring ever-increasing disclosure of information relating to the
highly public and influential sphere of activity that is politics is
understandably easy. In most instances such favor is justified. Yet at
some point that disclosure must have a limit, at least if we accept that
disclosure can both have real costs for those whose information is
disclosed and that individuals enjoy a fundamental although not
unlimited right to privacy.
Exploring these limits in the context of federal tax law generally,
federal tax law as it applies to tax-exempt organizations, and federal
election law reveals the operation of two significantly different
approaches to disclosure and privacy that have long been known to
privacy scholars. Consideration of both a cost-benefit approach and a
right-to-privacy approach is necessary to ensure that those whose
privacy is infringed are sufficiently protected, especially when
considering new disclosure rules. The current debate over the extent
to which information about the activities and financial supporters of
politically active, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations should be
disclosed is one example of an area where both approaches should be
applied.
Consideration of the disclosure proposals reveals, not surprisingly,
that under the cost-benefit approach, which tends to drive the federal
election law, the new disclosure provisions are favored, both with
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respect to the nonprofit organizations involved and their financial
supporters. While the cost-benefit case for disclosure is perhaps less
compelling for entities and individuals who provide relatively modest
financial support, this approach reveals little ground for objecting to
disclosure except in the relatively rare case of demonstrated and
significant retaliation or other concrete costs.
The right-to-privacy approach, which has more influence in the tax
area, also generally supports the disclosure proposals with one major
caveat. When those proposals relate to individual financial supporters,
they are only justified if they are limited to the individuals who
provide the largest levels of financial support such that their influence
over the recipient organization is likely sufficient to cause the
organization’s attempts to influence government action to
significantly reflect the individual supporter’s influence. This latter
approach, which is generally not considered in the federal election
law context, supports greater caution when considering disclosure
relating to individual financial supporters than the cost-benefit
approach would likely require. If for no other reason, consideration of
the right-to-privacy approach is important to ensure that in the zeal to
uncover possible undue or improper influence in the political sphere,
we as a society do not unnecessarily and improperly infringe on the
privacy and therefore the autonomy of individuals.
Laura Chisolm brought to the relatively new area of nonprofit law
a commitment to deeper thought and consideration of the reasons for
which that law exists and whether that law in its then current form
matched those reasons, particularly as it related to political
involvement. It is an honor to have had this opportunity to follow in
her footsteps with respect to the relatively narrow but important issue
of the extent to which the government should compel public
disclosure of information relating to politically involved nonprofits.
While I know this brief consideration does not match her work either
in its thoroughness or insight, I offer it in memory of her many
contributions as a scholar, teacher, and friend.

